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Fyala Fyala Mwedzi

Relativism & Moral Law

December 13, 2010
0:000:00

Let's begin with prayer. Lord, we thank You for the great privilege we have of knowing You, Creator of the ends of the earth and our redeemer. And, Lord of the nations, we pray that we may be faithful in our generation, to spread Your gospel to the whole world, and to hold up Your standards of righteousness, which are for our own good and for Your glory. We pray that You will be with us in this class, to give us insight and wisdom, appreciation for diversity and cultures, but above all, a love for Your law. These things we ask for Jesus sake. Amen. I want to add some, an excursus on cultural relativism and the moral law that we keep bumping into this issue. So I thought that I'd kind of sort through some things or that have to do with this. Talking about God's law that is universal. There's only one moral law as there's one law giver in Judgy who has given one moral law for the whole earth. So we are assuming the universality of the moral law that stems from God as Creator of all and ruler of all and judge of all. It's what C.S. Lewis calls the Tao, that's a shorthand for that, the moral law, as it has come to expression in various cultures at various times. And there's been a tendency, particularly in the last generation, to undermine the idea of there being a universal moral law because of the observations that come from cultural relativism. There are two parts to this. The first part is the fact of cultural diversity. We have constantly pressed upon us that moral practices vary from culture to culture. That is an empirical fact and we recognize it. But from this empirical observation, a normative judgment is thought to follow. You get this quite often that diverse moral practices, when you look at the world globally, diverse moral practices show that there is no universal standard of morality. The morality belongs to particular cultures and from the obvious fact that there are diverse cultural practice, there is the inference that there is no universal standard of morality. Although this insight is often associated with the modern age, the work of anthropologists, cultural anthropologists, particularly Margaret Mead has been associated with the cultural relativism. The point was made in the ancient world. The ancient ethicists were aware of this. There is a passage in Herodotus that gets cited from time to time. Herodotus writing in the fifth century before Christ is this brief paragraph. Darius, after he had got the kingdom called into his present certain Greeks who were at hand and asked, what should pay them to eat the bodies of their fathers when they die? To which they answered, there is no sum that could tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent for certain Indians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them while the Greeks stood by, what he should give them to burn the bodies of their fathers at their deceased? The Indians cried aloud and bade him for bear sense language. And so Herodotus concludes, Pindar was right in my judgment when he said, custom is the king overall. What is shocking to one group of people is the practices of another group, but then vice versa in this area of how to handle the dead. Now, I response, I think, should be along these lines that we should distinguish cultural relativism from moral relativism. And I have three points that I think may be made. The first point is that is to observe the logical fallacy, the fact of diversity does not entail that no standard exists. The fact of diversity doesn't prove that no standard exists. Some culture may know the standard and others not. Diversity does not prove that no standard exists, only that it may require critical reflection to discover the standard. There's a logical fallacy involved in moving from the fact of diversity to adopting a normal principle, but therefore there is no universal standard. To get this quite frequently in our culture, moral relativism is thought to be a logical inference from diversity of practice. When Jocelyn Elders was surgeon general, she was asked at one point whether it is right, whether it's wrong to have children out of wedlock and a response was no because everyone has different moral standards. Well, the fact that persons have different moral standards doesn't mean that to one of those standards isn't correct. It means that we need to sort through the standards to see whether in the interests of children having them out of wedlock is the right thing or a wrong thing to do. But you get that quite commonly. From the fact that people have different moral standards, no critique can be made. And that does, I think, one of the best answers to that is that we don't live that way, that we do find things that we could take of others. It would have been quite illuminating, had there been a follow-up question, whether the surgeon general thought polygamy was wrong. It is practiced in some cultures, and is the answer no because people have different standards or is that something that own critical reflection we may pursue a cross-cultural universal standard. So I think that's the first thing to observe. There is a logical fallacy when you move from description to a normative principle. It doesn't necessarily follow. Second response is that there may be unity in the diversity so that different customs may be culturally conditioned applications of a common principle. There may be unity in this diversity, so that different customs may be culturally conditioned applications of a common principle so that you're dealing with something in common, although the practice differs in a particular culture. In Herodotus example, the issue is how to respect the dead. Although there is diversity in practice, there is at least unity in principle, so theoretically it would be possible to ask the question which is the more appropriate response to the dead. As far as I know, whereas cremation has persisted as a means of, a respectful means of dealing with the dead, cannibalism has not. At some point, I mean, it may be practice in some remote isolated cultures, but you know, I think that there is the possibility of correction in the practice in really following through what the principle is. My third point would be, a CS Lewis illustrations of the towel indicate that the section is appendix to the abolition of man. Plainly, similarities do exist across cultures. We're told that every culture has to booze against incest and against wanton killing, at least within one's in-group, there is some sacredness to human life. Anthropologists have documented such universal elements. CS Lewis had documented the principles that there are embodied in those, and I would say even where particular practices and rules vary, we should notice that there are areas related to human beings living in this world, areas of moral responsibility that overlap. Life and health, marriage and family, these are not just arbitrary in terms of cultural. They are applying some universal principle. And at a fourth point, I did have a fourth one that I added here that some practices may be relative to culture and others not. For example, the head covering in apostolic times is a conventional way of showing public propriety and gender relations. But in other cultures, there are other ways of showing propriety and gender relations. And so it's artificial to introduce into a culture where that has no significance simply for the sake of following what was a convention in apostolic times, a head covering. How to show respect for the dead may be and some respects conventional. Christian sometimes debate of whether creation or burial is appropriate given the doctrine of the resurrection. So how to show respect for the dead may be in some respects conventional. But not to the point of requiring a widow to leap up on her husband's funeral pyre in an act of self-immolation, the practice of Sufi, which the British, when they ruled India, simply made against the law against the longstanding cultural practice. There are, we should distinguish between cultural practices that are applications of the principle and the principle itself in which practices may be corrected. Now, you can, practices can be corrected, provided you don't adopt the theory of cultural dependency. I got this thought in this expression of this thought from Arthur Holmes, longtime professor in Wheaton College, his little book on ethics, in which he cite so an anthropologist William Sumner, I've not read Sumner, but he writes, relativists like the anthropologist William Sumner, whole, that morality is not a matter of independent rational judgment, but is causally dependent upon cultural context. Run that bio again, relatives like the anthropologist William Sumner, whole that morality is not a matter of independent rational judgment, but is causally dependent upon cultural context. Therefore, the particular brality of a people cannot be other than it is. Truth of falsity of their moral beliefs does not really arise, and he cites a passage in Sumner. This means that if you're raised in a culture where cows are sacred, you don't question the truth of falsity of that, you just adopt it. I mean, that is culturally unquestionable. Now, our response should be, again, to make a distinction, as in the first case, we distinguish between cultural relativism and moral relativism, and the former doesn't imply the latter, doesn't entail the latter. Here, I think we should distinguish between cultural transmission and cultural determinism, distinguished between cultural transmission of moral principles, and cultural determinism. We are dependent on our culture, at least initially, for a lot of things, more than we realize in terms of practices that we adopt. But does that, it does not follow from that, that moral values are, by definition, culturally determined, so that we never question the truth of falsity of what we imbibe from our culture? And I have two points, by way of elaboration on that response. The first response is that as a matter of fact, historically, there have been internal critiques that arise within a culture. So I think that the idea of cultural dependency at the point of cultural determinism is historically falsifiable. To make the best example is the hippocratic oath. That's about 400 BC. Apocrities required of his students, his medical students, before he would allow them to study with them, he required of them an oath, among the things that he required in that oath, is that they would not use their medical knowledge to produce an abortion, or to allow a person to allow euthanasia, even if the person's request. So two of the issues that are being hotly debated in our culture now, apocrities, 400 BC, wrote that into his oath. Now, the hippocratic movement in medicine was a minority movement. When you read the hippocratic oath, it calls on all the gods of Greece. It's all the pagan gods by Apollo and all the others, as the oath made. So it's not directly influenced by biblical principles at that point, but it was a revolutionary movement that rose within Greek culture, which then with the coming of Christianity, Christian medical practice removed all the pagan gods and required the oath to be taken in the name of the Lord, the God and Father of Jesus Christ. So it became then the standard from the West. But it arose within Greek culture. Now, where apocrity has got the idea of doing that, we can't document. It is possible that biblical revelation had some, he was in contact with that. I don't think that we can exclude that. But in any case, it shows that there are prophetic voices that arise within a culture that critiques the standard cultural teaching and shows that we are, although initially, we are dependent upon our culture that it is not, we're not dependent upon it to the point of not ever having an internal critique. That in turn, we should not minimize, we should not minimize, the power of cultural formation. Gertrude Hemopharbe has a book, it was published 1995, The De-Moralization of Society. And she makes certain observations about the values imparted by the reigning culture, particularly in sanctity of life issues. And by now, have received the sanction of the state. And she writes, this is page 248, It takes a great effort of will and intellect for the individual to decide that something is immoral and act on that belief when the law declares it legal and the culture deems it acceptable. You can do it, it's not culturally determined. But it's not an easy thing to do to resist the culture to that extent. And so, as she goes on to say, this is searching, it's not only our political and cultural leaders who are prone to the failure of moral nerve, everyone has been infected by it, to one degree or another. We shouldn't think that we escape dependency upon our culture. We need to be critical examine and always engage in the process of critical examination ourselves because the cultural forming power of society, the moral forming power of our culture is a significant thing. The second point that I would make is that we recognize that across cultures there are exceptions to diversity. And you can rightly ask, are they do the sort of exceptions that you have in the Tao as Lewis represents them? Are these due to accidental similarities or to universal characteristics of human beings and their societies? A C.S. Lewis point is that these values are objective, the kinds of things that the references ended in the principles of the Tao are true to the kind of beings we are, true to the kind of beings we are. Well, if they're true to the kinds of beings that we are, then cross cultural critiques are also possible. We're talking about the possibility of universal moral principles because of a universal commonality of humanity. Our responsibility, I think, is to show that the beliefs may well change with more adequate information and moral instruction. Cultures are not monolithic. It becomes more and more clear in the information age that cultures are very fluid. What are the boundaries of a culture? It's no longer except in very remote areas where you have isolated groups of people that you can speak of a monolithic culture. We do exchange moral views and should not fail to enter into engagement with others and expose ourselves to that kind of moral engagement. I mentioned earlier in the course that the issue of infanticide was one of these accepted issues in culture that through the witness of Christians became unacceptable. Now, the appeal was to think through the principle in which human life is held to be wrong to take a human life and ask of what infants are and whether it's right to expose them to that kind of thing. So, cross-cultural critiques are possible. I think that a contemporary example to get some press is the parallel right for females as a right of passage to males in circumcision. It's called female circumcision, but actually this operation is very different from male circumcision. It's the removal of the clitoris. So, it's described now as a genital mutilation that has a pejority of aspect to it. But now, some cultures do practice that. Well, I think that that is a practice, a culturally conditioned culture accepted practice. Young girls want that operation to identify with their culture. That can be questioned cross-cultural. On the basis of whether or not that does as a matter of fact, cohere with human dignity and sexual function as God has created us to be. That is an issue that particularly some moral relatives find as a sticking point. It goes down very hard when you're talking about moral relatives and to come to this issue in which women are radically subordinated to the sexual desires of men so that their wife that they take is only for them in sexual pleasure is not a female ideal. That's a very different thing. Is this ethnocentric? That's typically the idea that you get in many of these arguments that it's arrogant and intolerant to critique another culture. But I think that that depends on how it is argued. I think that sometimes Westerners have been arrogant in the way that could teach other cultures. I think that the answer is to recognize we're all subordinate to the same moral law and that we all have sinned in fall short of the glory of God and to open ourselves to criticism of our culture from outside. That's a necessary function of cross-cultural engagement. So humility requires being open to criticism but not to, it's obvious that we cannot leave people to whatever practices they deem acceptable within their culture. The thing most in the news now is ethnic cleansing. Everybody you know regards ethnic cleansing as not just a culturally conditioned practice but it's appeal to a universal moral law that the nations commit themselves to. Now to how to go about this I think that we can apply in the issue of non-marital sex. How do we persuade people who accept non-marital sex? As according to a different standard I think that it is in the sexual area where people mainly press the relativism of the standards. I think that that's a self-serving faith but you get more agreement on human life although it has its problems now with modern technologies we'll see later on. But the most relativistic area is in terms of sexual relations where people resist being told that there is a right and a wrong. List made approach to this issue at one point by distinguishing between an ethics of caution we're talking about non-marital sexual intercourse, non-marital sexual relations. There is the one way to approach it is the ethics of caution which asks will I get hurt? Well that's not a wrong question to ask. You can get hurt. You can get hurt emotionally particularly if you're young but there's always an emotional element involved in this most intimate of human relationship. You can also get hurt physically and with the spread of venereal disease and now the dread disease, the fatal disease of AIDS, an ethics of caution which leads you to a monogamous relationship. Faithful relationship is a significant principle to bear in mind and to advocate cross culturally. There's then the ethics of concern, ethics of concern which would be will I hurt somebody else? That also is a legitimate question to ask. This ethics of caution is more egoistic but we've seen that self-referencing duties are not to be just excluded. There is a point. We have a moral responsibility to take care of ourselves but ethics of concern is concern less I hurt somebody else and you can't hurt somebody else. It's very destructive behaviors in terms of the risks that are taken emotionally with respect to female partner, the risk of pregnancy and all that goes with that. There's these two, both of these point us to a committed relationship as being the ideal place for sexual activity. The third area that he specifies is an ethics of command. This goes beyond the ethics of caution, ethics of concern. These are, when examined, consequentialist in nature. There are consequences as a part of our ethical reasoning. Some things are wrong because of their bad effects so you could argue that these are contingently wrong. There's also the question to be asked, is it right and you're talking there about something intrinsic in nature, whether it's right in terms of what sexuality is for the human person, whether this intimate of human relationships that has the potential to bring the children into the world, is right outside of a permanent monogamous relationship. I think that although we have a strong biblical argument for that, that it's possible to construct that in non-religious terms, if we do, it's probably better to use the language of character as a more to get a hearing. We, provided we understand within character, you commit yourselves to doing the right thing, that a mark of character is doing the right thing, which includes respect for others, respect for oneself, respect for the relationship and pursuing that line of thought, which we'll do in more detail when we come to the seventh commandment. You can make a case for that although people have different moral standards, they ought not to have different standards. Is bringing children into the world outside of marriage wrong? Well, look at the effects of bringing children into the world outside of a committed heterosexual relationship outside of marriage. We don't need to wait to be able to prove empirically the destructive effects of non-marital sex. We know in advance, in terms of the weight in which God has created us as human beings, that there is an inappropriate sexual intercourse because it's outside of that committed relationship. It comes down to whether sexuality is simply a function of physical organs for pleasure, or whether there is something especially life enhancing about it in a whole person union, so that natural law reasoning, which is what I'm adopting here, concludes that adultery and fornication are wrong because it takes from the human sex act its unity as well as its procreative aspect. I'll just set this up so that two human beings are joined in terms of that relationship with the potential of bringing children into the world. I think that that case has to be made but it is a cross-cultural standard and cross-cultural even within American society because we have now many sub-cultures that disagree on sexuality. This is something to be taught in the public schools if we approach it in terms of an ethics of character and there have been movements now to have abstinence based sex education in the public school and some of them have been very successful in terms of looking at it in terms of all these perspectives but including an intrinsic understanding of sexuality and relationship to human beings. The reason why marriage has had such a commitment up until our generation with the sexual revolution is because there's something in human nature that that's the most fulfilling aspect of human nature. It's been eroded since the latter part of the 20th century but it has looked at the devastation that it has brought in its wake. That's mainly what I wanted to say. There's a lot more than this to be added to that but I think you get a perspective. We shouldn't buy into cultural moral relativism from the fact of cultural diversity. We should recognize cultural diversity and appreciate it. We should not be swayed by the theory of cultural dependency because it's falsifiable both within cultures and cross-cultural. We do accept cross-cultural piece. It's not ethnocentric when one culture critiques another. We should mutually subordinate ourselves to finding the truth of the objective moral law. The first question is on this topic. The first thing to secure is not an argument for theism. This is an argument for the recognition of objective moral values. The first thing to do in our situation is not to get to the source of the moral law but to the fact of objective values. That's why in science CS Lewis it provides us a good model for getting at the issue. Once staff has established that yes we are being held to a universal moral law and such issues as apartheid now ethnic cleansing where there is universal agreement not universal because people continue to want apartheid and continue to do these acts of ethnic cleansing. But in terms of a moral critique of those there's more it's not a cultural thing it is a universal principle. Then you can ask where is the universal principle come from? Is evolution an adequate basis by which that can be determined? Apologetics is not my strong point. That's his strong point he does as well. That would be the next question to ask how moral distinctions granted that they are there. The first thing is to establish that they are there and people in spite of themselves recognize them. In spite of the postmodern observation that we all are in comfort ourselves we come with things that are our own perspective. That even postmodernism is self-defeating if it's thought to be deterministic because that would mean the postmodern theory is self-deterministic. So you argue in a circle but I think that the fact the matter is that we do not live that way either as individuals or as humanity. We make these judgments about certain actions that are not just inappropriate, they are wrong, they are immoral. And what is the source of that kind of language? What is the source of that judgment? I would say in advance that if human beings are created in the image of God no answer is going to satisfactory to give account of that except that it's God who has made us in this way. I think you can appeal to general revelation which is what I'm suggesting we do here which has the status of a command that's embodied in the way human beings are. So this is true to the way human beings are and there's wide recognition if not perfect recognition of that and then differences in terms of how it's worked out in practice. I think that it's a further step to ask how that can arise or if human beings are what the Bible says we are created in the image of God, no account of the moral law, no account of the Tao, no account of the platitudes of morality, first principles of practical reason will be adequate without tracing it back to the creator. And so I think the shaffer method is to go through the inadequacy of the various alternatives that are presented to show their inadequacy to create a vacuum in which the idea of God as the creator fulfills that. Now that's a complex process but I think that's still the viable method. We begin with the assumption, presupposition if you will, that human beings are created in the image of God, the source of moral knowledge is the creator and therefore no account of the morality will be adequate unless it takes that into account. And then comes the laborious job of analyzing positions as they arise and presenting the positive side of how on Christian assumptions, Christian presuppositions, things that are inexplicable on evolutionary basis fall into place. I want to read, since we got of just a little time here, I want to read you just one brief section from the book, Lesson of Blood be Shed. On July 31st, 1941, less than a year after the salute to the flag had been ordered by Vichy, there's a chapter in that on their reaction to that. Pastor Truck may receive the written order from the mayor of Le Shambon instructing him to ring at full tilt the bell of the temple for a quarter of an hour beginning at high noon August 1st. On that day, France would be celebrating the anniversary of Tetan's founding of the French legion of veterans for bringing about the national resolution. He was told that by ringing the bell, he would be showing his gratitude to the marshal for having brought discipline and pride into the soul of France by establishing that legion. All members of the legion had taken oath of allegiance to the marshal himself and not to any laws coming from the people or approved them. They were a militant force. The cutting edge of the national revolution in his task was to set an example of patriotic enmity against Jews, communists and Freemasons, and it goes on to describe them up yet. As soon as he received the order to ring the bell, Truck may went to the custodian of the temple and asked her not to do so. The next day, there was silence at noon around the temple, the little Catholic church of Le Shambon rang its bells expressing its ancient solidarity with the national government of France. Truck may never have heard what had happened at the temple if he had not met the custodian by accident the day after the anniversary in the big rambling square of Le Shambon. Now the custodian was named Emily and she was a Darbius. She is a Plymouth brethren and she has the job of being the custodian of the Reform Church. When on August 2, Truck may stood in the square like a tree over tiny sturdy Emily. Two allies were facing each other. Emily did not begin the conversation, she and her feather fellow Darbius were not given to chatter. Well, Emily, the pastor asked, everything went off well yesterday, no incidents. Everything went off well, Mr. Truck May, there was nothing wrong, Darbius silence. The truck may insist to come now, Emily. You were not visited by anyone? Oh, but yes, replied the piping voice with an accent that ended every syllable with a vowel. There were two ladies from up there and a tiny thick arm swept toward the northern hills of Le Shambon. You know those painted ladies who speak proper French silence. Emily was referring to the people who had come to Le Shambon for the summer from the great cities and who lived upon the hills and the handsome villas. Their cosmetic and their classic French were all that interested, Emily, about them. Well then, Has Park May, adopting with reluctance, the slow pace of Emily's speech. Well, they came to look for me and they said, you're not ringing the bell, Emily. It is a national holiday today. The pastor gave no orders, I told them. Oh, well, they told me we would really be surprised if he had allowed it to be wrong. Your pastor, come, Emily, hurry. It is noon and it is an order from the Marshall. Part of Emily's meager repertoire of expressions was a little crooked smile on one side of her mouth. This smile appeared suddenly. She looked up at the pastor. It was almost mischievous, useful smile of post-testers who in complete command of their situation. And what did you say? I told them that the bell does not belong to the Marshall, but to God. It is wrong for God. Otherwise, it is not wrong. Otherwise, no. Bravo. And then what happened? Oh, well, they ordered me to open the big front door and they told me that they would ring the bell themselves, but I did not want to do that. Then I defended my temple. There in the wide square of Le Shembon, Emily placed herself before Trocme as she had placed herself before the painted ladies, firmly planted on her feet, her thick arms outspread like the arms of a cross, shivering slightly with enthusiasm and with remembered power, defending her temple. Which was, of course, not her temple at all, since the Darbius worshiped in total independence from the human mass. And had it all in, Emily. Again, that smile, but her eyes were round. Oh, you remember, Mr. Trocme, yesterday at noon it was raining spears, hard. I was under the lentil of the big door. The painted ladies were out in the courtyard. Soon they were dripping wet and they left. Well, you know, those ordinary acts of firmness in the right just are part of the story. There are many examples like that in the book. There are heroes, you know, and Emily is certainly one of them.