Back in and get ready to take up a discussion of the classical proofs for God's existence. Somebody asked me during break if I would come back and say something more under C that whole thing of the analogy of being and say something about my own position here. What I think of the analogy of being. And the reason, as the person put it, there are a lot of cults about today, which do want to speak of man as a little chunk of God, of basically want to deify human existence. Let me basically say this, and this is the position taken by Calvin as well, that the analogy of being was a philosophical construction. It was a bad idea. There is no analogy of being. Again, go back to Genesis 1, 1, in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. That biblical metaphysics is simply this. God, not God. We're here. We're on this side of the line. Everything about us is on this side of the line. Yes, the issue of analogy, and we'll talk about it later, is important for us. We do know God analogically, but there is no ontological correspondence here between God and ourselves. Even the language of man as the Amago Day, the image of God in Genesis 1, 26, or 28, does not suggest that human beings are little carbon copies of God. It rather suggests that we have been dynamically called to image, reflect, represent God within the created order. That makes sense, guys? That's the very problem that we simply look at ourselves and make conclusions about God. I hope you can see where I'm going with this. I hope I'm doing the same thing at Calvin was doing in the first five chapters of the institutes. We're not going to know God outside of how he reveals himself, politically. And what we see is there is an analogical knowledge going on there, but it's an analogy of the common world. It's an analogy that God enters into the world and acts as a participant in it. And that's not an ontological correspondence. What that is is God saying, you see that? I'm like that. You see that? That's high-relate. You see those other things? Kind of like that. It's an epistemological analogy. We'll talk more about that, that issue next week, as we take up the issue of names, roles, and those sorts of things. Let's come now to room number three, arguments for the existence of God. When we think of proofs or arguments for God's existence, we naturally think of Thomas Aquinas, we mentioned him last hour. The contribution of Aquinas to this discussion is of major importance. In his suma theological, Aquinas spoke of five ways of proving God's existence, or five ways that God's existence can be shown through intellectual analysis. And he did that by arguing from the effects of nature to their cause. But even before Aquinas, we need to talk about Enselm of Canterbury. And he put forward what is certainly the most famous of all so-called proofs for God's existence, the ontological argument. And we want to look at Enselm and his ontological argument from the prosologian, which was written in 1079. Enselm begins by offering a definition of God. He said, God is that then which nothing greater can be conceived. You have to repeat that about three times in your head before you figure out what he's saying. Further, he said that the idea of such a being is one thing, the reality of such a being is another. And to exist in reality is better than to exist only in the mind. Therefore, then which nothing greater can be conceived must exist both in reality and in thought. Now, there's a rather obvious logical weakness in the argument, although it must be stressed that Enselm himself did not consider either an argument for God's existence or a proof. The weakness is brought out in Enselm's critic, Guanillo. Guanillo wrote a little thing called a reply on behalf of the fool. And that was a reference to the fool of Psalm 14, verse 1. The fool says in his heart there is no God. Guanillo's criticism of Enselm's ontological argument went this way. He said, imagine a lovely island. An island so lovely that a more perfect island cannot be imagined by Enselm's thinking that island must exist in that the reality of the island is necessarily more perfect than the mere idea of the island. Does that make sense? Now Enselm responded here that well, come on, Guanillo God's not an island. And perfection isn't part of our definition of islands, but it is part of our definition of God. And there's no analogy between islands and human thoughts. But there is an analogy between God and humans. But this quite frankly missed Guanillo's objection. The objection is that Enselm has created a fundamental category error. He has confused the order of being and the order of knowing. Immanuel Kant saw this very clearly in the 18th century. He argued that emergent cannot multiply his wealth simply by moving the decimal place in his books. We might wish it were true that we could do that, but we can't. Either the money exists or it doesn't. To exist in the mind is one thing, to exist in reality is really something very different. Conceiving of having more money has little to do with the matter one way or another. In other words, beliefs must be justified by states of affairs outside of the mere belief. Now it's about all I'm going to do with the ontological argument. I should point out that even though it's been criticized just as I have criticized the argument, an entire army of philosophers have redone it and redone it and redone it. A theistic philosophers on one side keep coming back to the ontological argument and non-theistic philosophers on the other side keep trying to knock it down. Today the ontological argument has gotten very complex indeed. We looked at simply the original and fairly simple form here. This prepares us to now turn to Thomas Aquinas and his five ways. I should point out even before we get started that these five proofs were not completely original. Most of them, in fact, go back to Aristotle who had already spoken of God as the first cause and the last end of the world. And you'll note on your outline there that arguments one, two, and three are all spoken of as cosmological arguments. The fact of the matter is these three arguments, the first three ways are really just three different ways of saying the same thing, of stating the same argument. Well I'm going to ask you to hold on to that question. The question is find it hard to understand why we need to explain God outside of his revelation. I'm going to ask you to hold on to that for a little bit. But let me just very quickly say that generally we like the idea of God. We don't want the reality of God. You see the God that we have in Scripture is a personal, isn't it being? That's too abstract. It's a person. And persons always come with expectations. They all do. You have expectations about me as your professor. And you're right to. You have personal moral expectations about every other person, including people in office. And you're right to. It seems to me, again, we like the idea of God but we don't like the obligations. And that is a kind of judgment. But we'll come back to those kinds of issues. Well, let's look at Thomas's first argument here. The argument from motion. This, again, this argument is not original. It's stated in Aristotle's metaphysics. As a matter of fact, it's a version of it. Even his older goes back to Plato. But it goes like this. The world isn't static. Rather, it's always moving. It's dynamic. We live in a dynamic world. The question is, why did nature come to be in motion? Why isn't nature static? If we assume that rest is the natural order of things, and motion is a natural, then we must explain motion. Now, following that tradition, as it was originally set down by people like Plato and Aristotle, a coin is argued that everything that moves is moved by something else. Things don't just move. For every motion, there's a mover. In each thing that is moved, let me restate that. Each thing which moves something else is itself moved. You know, think of balls on a pool table. Even though the cue ball hits the six ball and drives the six ball into the pocket, the cue had to strike the cue ball. So everything that moves something else is itself moved. Thus, a coin is argued that there's a whole series of causes of motion lying behind the world as we know it. Now, unless there's an infinite series of movers, you know, the eight ball hits the six ball, which hits the five ball, which hits the 39,375 ball, and so on and so forth. Unless there's an infinite series of these movers, then there must be a single mover at the origin of the series. From this original cause of motion, all other motion is ultimately derived. And the first in the series is the mover, or as a coin has put it, he is unmoved. And it's unmoved because it's the source of all movements. Should it be moved? Some other mover stands behind it in a fact, moving it. And then the mover who moved it would be the first mover. Y'all got that? Don't ask me to repeat it. I don't think I can. Thus God is the unmoved mover. We might think here of Thomas's statement that God is a rock. You know, you're on the beach and there's a big rock at the shoreline. The rock doesn't move. Everything moves around it. But in effect, the rock caused you to move because you had to move around it. So the rock moved you. And Thomas said, God is like that rock. All is in movements around him, even though he is unmoved. Second, the argument from causation. We notice that we live in a world that's full of causes and effects. Every effect has a cause. Again, things don't just happen. The principle that's really going on here in all of these cause-modular arguments is the principle of sufficient reason. Is that term on your outline? Some people are saying yes or no. Okay, it is there. The cause for an effect must, and this is the principle of sufficient reason. The cause for an effect must be at least as great as the effect. Does that make sense? We can state that somewhat crudely is, you know, chickens don't give birth to rocket scientists. Yeah, that would work. Or something never sprang from nothing. Therefore, the universe cannot be uncaused. The principle of sufficient reason says the universe must be caused by something. But how can a mutable, contingent, dynamic world be uncaused? It can't happen, so it must be caused, and it can't produce these effects within itself. There's no internal principle of causation. Thus, Aquinas concluded that God is the first cause. Each one of these arguments, these first three arguments, again, are versions of the same argument, so you can get simpler each time. If you notice when you go through them, the first one has six points, the second one has five points, the third one has three points, because you're basically using the same deductive reasoning here. The third argument, the argument from contingency. We notice that the world contains creatures which do not exist necessarily. The world has creatures that are contingent. They are dependents. As contingent beings, our existence requires an explanation. Again, sufficient reason. How is it that we exist? What happened to bring us into existence? And something comes into being only because another causes it. Our being is an effect. So you see these three arguments. I remember the same argument. You're simply changing the language. And here, in this argument, we trace everything back to a necessary being. So using the issue of, first of all, looking at the world, seeing its reality, and using the principle of sufficient reason, denying an infinite series of regressions, we conclude, or a coin is concluded, that God is the unmoved mover. He is the first cause, and he is the necessary being. We can spend a lot more time with those three arguments, but there's really not a whole lot of necessities to do that. Fourth, the argument from morality or the moral argument. The Enlightenment philosopher Emmanuel Kant is usually cited as the originator of the moral argument, but a coin has had already put forth a version of it a couple hundred, several hundred years before. A coin has said this. People of different cultures and beliefs recognize certain basic moral values and obligations. Moral values such as truth, goodness, and nobility are universal. And the question is, where do these moral ideas come from? What causes them? We might pause here and note that this argument particularly would be under fire today, the idea that, if you look at all the cultures of the world, that there are universal in those cultures. Well, he further argued that these values can't be derived from the material world. Why? The principle of sufficient reason. Material things only exist on the material plane, and moral values imply a moral plane, which transcends the merely material. The merely material cannot produce morality, cannot produce moral reflection. There must be something which is itself true, good, and noble. Again, the principle of sufficient reason. How is it that human cultures have a sense of these things because there must be that thing which causes them? And this something which is inherently true, good, and noble brings into being our ideas of truth, goodness, and nobility. The fifth argument, the argument from design. This is sometimes called the teleological argument. Versions of the teleological argument are predate acquaintance by many, many millennia. They go back to the very beginnings of the history of philosophical thought. And the argument from design may be the most popular and intelligible of all the arguments. I think it's the one that makes the most intuitive sense to people. It's the fact that the Enlightenment thinker volt hair put the argument in rather simplistic terms when he said this. Quote, if a watch proves the existence of a watchmaker, but the universe does not prove the existence of the great architect, then I consent to be called a fool. Well, a coin is put a little differently. He said this. Things in our experience appear to serve ends, ends beyond their devising or their control. What we see is that there's evidence of purpose all around us. The world we live in is not willy-nilly. It is ordered and things have functions. But all of this, this order, these functions, this purpose implies a plan, a purpose, someone or something with the capacity to execute its purposes. And thus, one things serve ends beyond their own devising to the purposefulness of creation implies a purpose, and three, God is the designer of the universe. Writing in the evangelical dictionary of theology, AJ Hoover in his article, arguments for the existence of God, wrote this, and I quote the entire paragraph here, and it's there in front of you. And I include it here, so I think it shows how inherently intuitive the theological argument is. No one can deny the universe. No one can deny that the universe seems to be designed. Instances of purpose of ordering are all around us. Almost anywhere can be found features of being that show the universe to be basically friendly to life, mind, personality and values. Life itself is a cosmic function that is a very complex arrangement of things, both terrestrial and extraterrestrial, must obtain before life can subsist. The earth must be just the right size. Its rotation must be just right. Its distance from the sun must be within certain limits. Its tilt must be correct to cause the seasons. Its land water ratio must be a delicate balance. Our biological structure is very fragile. A little too much heat or cold and we die. We need light but not too much ultraviolet. We need heat but not too much infrared. We live just beneath an air screen shielding us from millions of missiles every day. We live just 10 miles above a rock screen that shields us from the terrible heat under our feet. Who created all these screens and shields that make our earthly existence possible? Once again we are faced with a choice. Either the universe was designed or it developed all these features by chance. A cosmos is either a plan or an accident and a quote. Hoover goes on after saying that to discuss the notion of chance, I think in a very engaging little argument. He says that chance contradicts the ways we ordinarily explain things. You see an appeal, the chance is not an explanation at all. It's an appeal to agnosticism and agnosticism which violates all the canons of science. So when a scientist looks at any immediate reality, he operates under the assumption that we live in a regular, predictable and noble universe. One in which the orderly procession of cause and effect holds. Yet when the naturalist comes to ultimate or metaphysical questions, questions like the origin of the universe, he abandons the principle of sufficient reason and he appeals to chance. That's a good argument. That's a good argument. Hoover further argues that an appeal to the doctrine of evolution does not dismantle the teleological argument. In fact, evolution does not negate design. All it does is it introduces a mechanism for purpose of instrumentality. And it must be explained. Evolution is not an explanation. It's something which itself must be explained. Well, back to the more general issue of a teleological argument. I just concluded that because I thought it was cool stuff. People such as David Hume and a manual Kant, both of them were extremely suspicious of natural theology. Both of them affirmed the teleological arguments. Admittedly, human and less forceful way than Kant. But the teleological argument has had a real bite for people since the beginning of time. Well, an assessment from the number three. Three, four. Oh, two typos. It's three if you count the one in my notes. You know, make my correction here in the next version. I'll get it right. Room number four. It should be noted that most of Aquinas' arguments are pretty similar. Each depends on tracing a causal sequence back to its original origin and identifying that origin has got. But I'd like to suggest here that we really misunderstand what Aquinas is about if we seriously take his so-called five ways as proofs. Some philosophers have suggested that Aquinas was seeking to actually prove the existence of God by these arguments. But I kind of doubt it. You see, the summa is a truly massive work. It's over 4,000 pages in length, but he spends no more than two pages on the five ways. The entire discussion is very short, and he never calls them proofs. Like Anson, Aquinas was seeking an intellectual analysis of what he already believed. I think what Aquinas was doing was apologetics. And if we recall, we said the apologists were about defending the reasonability of the faith. You're within your intellectual rights to believe, and I think that's what Thomas Aquinas was doing as well. You see, he didn't believe in God because of any of these arguments. Any more than Anson believed in God because of the ontological argument. Both of them believed because of God's revelation of himself in Jesus Christ and Scripture. They both say that. And quite frankly, Aquinas expects his readers to share that belief. He does not expect his readers to get to that point and go, aha, there must be a God. He does not believe that he must prove God's existence. So I think what we actually have here are classical apologetics rather than real proofs that would bring unbelievers to faith. Having said that, it does have to be noted that philosophers and theologians after Aquinas started talking about the five ways as proofs and have treated them ever since as proofs. That's why we're talking about them this way as well. And at least part of the reason here is that Aquinas did tend to be pretty much more rationalist. As a matter of fact, he went so far as to define faith as intellectual sin to propositions. Now that kind of definition of faith and with the kinds of approaches to theology that he took, it's understandable that people would treat the five ways as proofs, even though I doubt very highly that they were intended as such. B. As proofs, Aquinas does five ways fail. And I think they feel badly. First of all, it seems as I read them that each assumes what it seeks to prove. That is to say that the points in the arguments sometimes appear to be mere conveniences that will get you to the conclusion outside of the assumptions that prove nothing. Oh, wait a minute. Maybe what they say, maybe they do prove something. Maybe they say more about us really than they say about God. So rather than proving that God exists, maybe if they do prove anything, they prove that we need to believe in God. The question, why should any or all of these arguments lead to only one God? There's no reason to assume that there's only one God from His arguments. It certainly is not proven that there's only one unmoved mover. Maybe two got together and were both unmoved but moved. Other things. You understood what I said. There's no reason to assume one single first cause, necessary being, the focus of all truth or single designer. Third, why not an infinite regression of causes? Remember Thomas just said no. But he didn't prove it. And he knew it was improved. He wasn't proving it. It's one of the reasons I don't think he's he's trying to get proofs. Why can't you demonstrate that the series is finite? You have to assume it. Fourth. Interestingly, none of Aquinas' five ways show that God continues to exist. That objection, by the way, does not apply to anthillological arguments. You see, the five ways speaks only to the beginnings of experienced conditions. Fifth, the God who's spoken of in these arguments is not necessarily the God of biblical revelation. As a matter of fact, if these arguments lead to any deity, it's not the deity of the Bible. It's Aristotle's God. A God who at the end of the day is a rather cold and underwhelming deity. For Aristotle insisted that God is an impersonal principle. God is not a person. Imagine praying. O great unmoved mover. O first cause. O necessary being. It just doesn't ring truth. Now, this last should capture our attention. Far too often, and this is kind of where I've been heading tonight. Far too often, Christians have accepted uncritically the methodologies of pagan philosophy for thinking about God. And we've simply tried to baptize them. The fact is that Greek metaphysics does not lead to the personal God of Scripture. It does not lead to a God who enters into personal, covenantal relationship. Method and content always go together. Methods are not neutral. Philosophical methodologies are not value neutral. They're value laden. You see, the Greeks were not seeking to know the God with whom we have to do. They were seeking to understand a purely human world. There was a kind of secularism that was part of the Greek philosophical mind. They wanted an impersonal God. A God who cannot place an obligation upon man. Consequently, a God who cannot save. It kind of gets back to the question earlier. This brings us to see kind of the cost. Whenever natural theology and the kinds of processes we've been talking about tonight, whenever these have been particularly strong in the history of the church, the tendency has been for the church to fall into a kind of deism. The term I should have put on the board. Deism is the idea that God is the creator, but he has no present involvement in the world. Further, deism has always tended toward an impersonal view of God. Good example here is John Locke's essay, Concerning Human Understanding. You see that top page 50 in your notes. Written 1690. In that essay, Locke developed an idea of God which became very characteristic of English deism. Locke argued, I'm going to quote him here, quote, reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being. The attributes of this being are those which human reason recognizes as being appropriate for God. Having considered which moral and rational qualities are suited to the deity, Locke argued, quote, and listen to him here, you can see the whole agenda of Greek natural theology. We enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity. That's super irrigation. And so, putting them together, we make our complex idea of God. In other words, the idea of God is made up of human, rational, and moral qualities projected into infinity. Now, with that, armed with that kind of method, the deists of the next century, the 18th century, would throw out the Bible. They would throw out Christianity. People like Matthew Tindale, 1730, his book Christianity is old as creation. He claimed that Christianity is no more than a republication of natural religion, a religion which comports with human reason. You see, reason stands above all religion and judges religion because it's human reason, which is finally deified here. Whatever does not fit with reason must be rejected as superstitious myths. What gets rejected here, the idea of a God who enters into historical relationship, the idea of a God who cares about you, that doesn't make sense. The idea of a God who is incarnate, the idea of a God who dies, the idea of a God who can act in the world. Very quickly, deistic ideas found their way across the continent. They would influence people like Voltaire, Lessing, and Conte, and they would come to North America where they formed the fundamental confessional convictions of some of the founding fathers. Let me just enclosing this here. I'm going to open this up for questions. Let me suggest that mere theism, a mere belief in God, is never a virtue. Yahweh says, worship me, not God in the abstract, not the idea of God, not what your mind tells you I must be like, but worship me as I've revealed myself. It's interesting that throughout the Old Testament, Israel is charged to choose between Yahweh and Bale. Bale was a God too. No wonder I can't see. I've been wearing the wrong glasses all night. Go ahead. I can't hear you either. The eyes of the second thing to go. Kindle said that Christianity is a little more than a restatement. You see, I can think with my glasses on. I'm going to have to see the notes. Christianity is a restatement, the religion of a reason. But it's only where it's a restatement of the religion of a reason that Christianity is true. These general ideas, the ideas like divine justice, the being of God, those kinds of things. Those are all true, but they get told through a series of superstitious stories. Thus, someone like Thomas Jefferson will go through and edit the Bible, edit the miracles of scripture out, because they don't fit with reason. Does that make sense? Other questions? Right here. As a matter of fact, Lewis is an interesting character here because he was moved to faith by these kinds of arguments. There is something to them, but I would not want to call them proofs. And again, I don't think that I, as I read Aquinas, I don't think he would want to call them proofs on it. Yes. Is it based on, are they not guilty of going back in the infinite regress of physical problems and rules? Yes. One does run into the problem of sufficient reason. Yes. Pure naturalists do have to project that somehow mere sentience. First of all, you have to get from inanimate matter to animate matter, from animate matter, sentient being, from sentient being to moral consciousness, and they have a real problem making those kind of category leaps. And the principle of evolution itself cannot do it, it seems to me. There is a violation of sufficient reason. Yes. That doesn't stop people from doing it. Yes. I think so. Yes. You do have to entertain some kinds of explanations for those mechanisms. Now the way someone like Harold Wilson said, Harold Wilson at Harvard? Harold was not sound right. It's Wilson, the biologist there. He would want to argue that these kinds of things are purely functions of genetics, that a moral sense is part of our need to defend the mechanism. But all kinds of problems get raised, that what happens with altruism is a whole chapter, one of his books in the altruism gene, which doesn't, doesn't seem to track very well, seems to me. But interesting hopes that people have to jump through to try to get around the principle of sufficient reason, or to find it, so that you can make those leaps from non-sentient to sentient to self-consciousness and those kinds of knowledge. Well, I don't think there is a great difference. Quite frankly, and again, I didn't try to define classical fiasms. I just kind of assumed what we were going to do then was classical fiasms, and therefore that would be the definition. I would not define them very differently, except to say that natural theology for natural religion is the process. Natural religion is the process which says that we can come to a reasonable and credible knowledge of God apart from the sources of particular revelation. And the product then could be called classical fiasms. As a matter of fact, the categorical classical fiasms interestingly is going through a renaissance today, and it's going through a renaissance because of the issue of process fiasms. Ron Nash, in one of his books, I don't recall which, claimed that there are only two options before us. There's either process thought or classical fiasms. Well, I think there are more options on that. I hope there are more options. But what's happening today is that many people, they see the problems of process philosophy and they should, and they react to it. We tend to be reactionary creatures. They react to it by thinking, well, you can't get further away from it than classical fiasms, true. So they think that, well, that classical fiasms must be a good idea. So it is going through something of a renaissance today. Remember Calvin wanted to affirm that natural revelation, right? A creation revelation, revelation, providence, and a revelation in human conscience. However, he was very careful to stipulate that as fallen creatures, that knowledge of gods in the world is, well, it's like me without my glasses on. I have a sense that you're there, Camille, but I'm not exactly sure what color your eyes are from this distance. So while we have a sense, again, from Romans 1, we know someone's in the room, and we know we're accountable. We don't know a full shape of his face. We don't know the name. Now, one could argue that by God's common grace, I think this is where you were headed, that he upholds enough of the deposit of his revelation and creation and other general revelational means that people like Plato and Aristotle and Philo and other philosophers have come to some real knowledge about God. Does that make sense? Well, one would have to say, okay, now the problem here is getting two philosophers to agree on anything. At that point, it becomes a little bit funny, actually. Plato is not Aristotle, as a matter of fact, the two of them disagree a lot. Even within Greek metaphysics, there's an awful lot of variety. We have a tendency to compress it into one thing, and I do too. It's a handy pedagogical device. What the reality is is that it's highly malleable. You see, the funny thing about ideas is you can change them, and you can make them fit in different ways. They're very different from persons and events and rocks and trees. So then we have the issue of, there is a kind of logic to that argument of common grace that would uphold some knowledge of God. From real knowledge of God. Then the problem is, okay, which knowledge? Which statements? Which assertions? Certainly, there must be some out there that are true, but it just makes sense. Just on a probabilistic argument, right? But how do I judge those? Again, the argument seems to me is going to come back to the revelation scripture, that particular revelation. And we're right back with Calvin, as with Solvarscriptura, the Bible as the norm of norms. It's more than possibly true that people, by whatever means, have come to assertions about God. Which are true? Which are true? But how am I going to judge those? What is going to be the canon or the criterion, but which I'm going to make a discern judgment? Does that help? Other questions to see? Well, the question was, in AJ Hoover's little piece there on a teleological argument, what's he mean by chance there at the end of the evolutionary argument? Simply, to me, simply that they throw out the principle of sufficient reason. They throw out the cause-infect analysis that they're used to and plead a kind of agnosticism. Chance itself is not an explanation. Well, I'm not sure. It seems to me that that's naturalists do not speak without purpose. It seems to me they will talk about a purpose, but that purpose will be a purely imminent purpose within the universe. Such as we see in botanists who will talk about cells will seek to defend themselves. That's a kind of purpose of statement. So it's not throwing out purpose altogether. I don't think that one has, if one talks about a purpose, that one is automatically a theist. Am I catching your question? And more than that, they're throwing out their own basic scientific method, and the principle of sufficient reason, and they're just appealing to a kind of chance event. Sort of hint here? No? We are going to break a little early tonight because I have again been dragging you through this. I will warn you that the first hour next time, I'm going to do it again, as we talk about essences and attributes, but in the middle of next week, we're going to change gears, and we're going to start thinking, we're going to try to think, start thinking biblically rather than abstractly. And as we do, I hope you go, gee, someone just opened the window. How did it go tonight? I saw a couple of people going, I don't know, I was running around glasses, so I could have been confused. Okay, there's no other questions. See you next week.