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Vol. 28 ·No. 48 · November 22, 2026

The Bondage of the Will

Section 9: Erasmus Avoids the Question of God's Foreknowledge

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این مقاله را مانند یک مجله ورق بزنید — صفحه عنوان، صفحه نویسنده و صفحات متحرک در هر دستگاه.

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This article is based on the translation made in 1823 by Edward Thomas Vaughan. The language has been modernized with the assistance of CoPilot AI, with further alterations and final approval by Thirdmill’s editorial staff.

The second major issue in Christian doctrine is this: Does God know the future in a way that allows for contingency, or is everything we do predetermined? You, like many others who dismiss serious theological inquiry, label this question as irreverent, overly speculative, and pointless. Even the forces of evil regard it with disgust. And while it may seem wise to avoid such difficult questions—if that’s even permissible—you undermine your credibility as both a theologian and a communicator when you try to teach about free will without addressing them.

Let me sharpen your thinking. I may not be a trained rhetorician, but I’ll remind a master of rhetoric what good argumentation requires. Imagine Quintilian, the great teacher of oratory, saying, “Let’s skip invention, structure, style, memory, and delivery—just know that oratory means speaking well.” Wouldn’t you laugh at such a craftsman? That’s exactly what you’ve done. You claim to write about free will, but you discard all the essential components of the topic.

You cannot grasp what free will truly is without first understanding what human will is capable of and what role God plays—especially whether He foreknows our actions. Even basic rhetorical training teaches that before discussing any subject, one must ask: Does it exist? What is it? What are its parts? What opposes it? What is it related to? What is it like?

But you’ve stripped poor Free Will—already a fragile concept—of all these supports. You only ask whether it exists, and leave the rest untouched. Soon we’ll see what kind of arguments you use to do this. Frankly, I’ve never read a more misguided book on free will—though I’ll grant you have a way with words. Even the Sophists, who lack rhetorical skill, manage to ask better questions than you. They at least try to define free will: whether it exists, what it is, what it does, how it works. They don’t finish the job, but they start it.

So in this work, I intend to prod you—and them—until you clearly define what free will can do and how it operates. Yes, with Christ’s help, I’ll press you so thoroughly that you’ll regret ever publishing your Diatribe.

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