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Derma Derma Bulanan

Doctrine of God; Classical Theism

December 13, 2010
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Let's pray together. Dear Heavenly Father, we thank you for your many, many blessings to your people and the wonderful things that you bring into our lives. We thank you Lord for such a great salvation in Jesus Christ, a Savior who literally went all the way, all the way to the cross, to claim a people for Himself. And we thank you Lord by your special favor, by your particular choice that you have made each and every one of us, your children. We pray this evening that, as we again, turn our attention to you that we would seek to do so faithfully, that we would seek to do so controlled by your word and not controlled by our speculations. We pray that you would guide us this evening and that you would be with us for it's in Jesus' name. We pray. Amen. Last time we were together, we started to talk about God as the covenant Lord. And if you recall, we said there that God can only be known in the context of the covenants. We only know Him as He binds Himself to His creation in covenant relationship. And His accommodation of His revelation is a function of that covenant bond. Further, we know just in passing that we only know ourselves there too. We only know ourselves as we relate to God, and that's where John Calvin began, his institutes of the Christian religion, the knowledge of God and the knowledge of self, are interrelated. This evening we want to pick up Roman numeral six in that discussion. That's the top of page 44 of your outline. How does God relate in covenant? And here we want to deal particularly with two terms, the terms transcendence and immanence. If God is the Lord of all things, then He is separate from those things. In other words, He is not those things. He cannot be confused with that over which He exercises Lordship. God is exalted above creation. The traditional theological term here is transcendence. And all the word means is that God stands above. God stands apart from creation. Genesis 1.1 tells us that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The biblical metaphysics is made up of two realities, God and not God, God and creation. The two cannot be confused. But we also said that God is the Lord within covenant relationship. This means that He is involved with His creation. He is again to use a rather traditional term. He is immanence. God is close to His creation. John frame is certainly correct. And he notes that it has historically been the case that serious problems have attended the concepts of transcendence and immanence. And there are two major problems here. The first one is this. It is sort of the confusion of these two terms. Or I could better say it this way. The notion that these two terms belong to the same conceptual range. But each one is simply either the negation of or the flip side of the other. God is transcendence, God is immanence. The second problem is this. It is the confusion of what we're going to call the order of being, ontology, and the order of knowing epistemology. Let me take these two terms here just for a second and try to define them. When we talk about the order of being, we're talking about what is real or what is true. And the philosophical term here is ontology, the study of being, the order of knowing. How do we know that's epistemology? How do we know what is real? How do we know what is true? Those are different questions. That is it and how do we know it or what it is. Those are two different questions. But it's often been the case that questions in one order have been confused and asked in the other order. Well, let's see how this confusion between transcendence and immanence plays out. First of all, transcendence. Frequently, God's transcendence. It's ontological otherness, not that I've introduced the word ontology, I'm going to use it as an adjective. God's ontological otherness has often been understood as God being so infinitely removed from us, so distant, so wholly other that he's hidden from us in such a way that we can have no real knowledge of him, that we can make no truthful statements about him. See right there? How I move from an ontological statement, God is other to an epistemological statement, thus we can know nothing about him. It's very easy to get these things confused. Someone say that we can confess God's existence, but beyond that we must stand mute. God is so different, so distant, so far away that we cannot know Him. A good example here is a recent book by William Plocker entitled The Domestication of Transcendence. Following in the tradition of Karl Bart, Plocker argues that God so transcends all creaturely categories and analogies, that our language about Him is at best provocative and approximate, and at worst our language is idolatrous. We may experience some kind of divine human encounter, but all our attempts to express that encounter, our attempts to doctrinalize from that experience are merely the creations of a nose of wax and idol of the human mind. Now, if you think about it, it must be said that in very practical terms, such a God as depicted by Plocker, or maybe I should better say, confessed, but never described, renders us all kind of pious atheists. This God says nothing to us, and He can make no demands upon us. And all covenantal relationship is denied. This is basically, Plocker is, let me use him as kind of the poster boy for radical existentialism. God exists, but He is so different, so utterly distant, that we can have no knowledge of Him. God's ontological otherness entails unknowability. That makes sense, folks. Let's turn to Eminence. What is oftentimes the exact other end of the theological spectrum, God's Eminence is also frequently misunderstood. Eminence is often thought. And such a way as to be thought of as asserting that God is indistinguishable from the world. That when God enters our creation, when He enters our world, He becomes so worldly that He can't be found, God is so equivalent with creation that His activity and person cannot be identified in space and time. For God affects all spaces, all times equally and none in particular. If we associated the first position with existentialism, we might associate this vision of or understanding of Eminence with pantheism, kind of new age thought, and process philosophy, which we'll talk about at the end of the semester. I'd also put someone like Carl Sagan into this category. If you saw his movie Contact, the female scientist was a most religious person, but her religion was with the universe, the deity and the universe are the same thing. Now both of these positions, both that God is utterly, utterly distinct and God is utterly indistinct, both of them extreme as they are and different as they are from one another and in the same place. Both of them reject a revelation in which God is distinguishable and knowable that you can distinguish God from His creation and know Him. And both of them deny any human obligation to the divine. The radical transcendence of existentialism secularizes all reality, for the divine cannot be found. And the radical imminence of pantheism sacralizes all, for it makes God indistinguishable from the created order. The result of both, again, is a kind of pious atheism or agnosticism. If God is wholly other, then how can we know or say that He's wholly other? If God is to be completely identified with creation, then one of the two of them is redundant. Why not simply speak of creation and leave God out of the matter? And you think about either of these positions, how would one validate any statement about God at all? Well, I hope you can see that the language of transcendence and imminence is a bit sticky and it can be confusing. In fact, both terms can be used in a number of different ways. The term transcendence can be used to refer to either ontological difference or cognitive distance depending on whether you use it as a statement from the order of being or you use it as a statement qualifying the order of knowing. Likewise, imminence can be referred or can be used to refer to either ontological association if you use it ontologically or moral proximity and personal intimacy if it's used epistemologically. What we need to know, and I'm going to put this forward simply as a presupposition, is that these two terms transcendence and imminence are not true compliments of one another. Each one of them properly deals in a different realm so they're not simply two sides of the same coin. I want to suggest, or be one in your outline, I want to suggest that transcendence is properly understood as an ontological qualifier. What is transcendent is in that he is different from his creation. He cannot be confused with it. Imminence properly understood or employed in terms which agree with scripture. Let me remember both these terms, neither of these words are biblical terms. The question is how can we use them so that they comport with what scripture actually says we've got? Imminence properly understood is not an ontological qualifier. Rather, it's a term of personal proximity, it's a term of relationship. Imminence speaks of God's closeness to his creation, but not closeness in composition, it's not like God has made up of the same stuff that we are. Rather, it's a closeness of proximity, time, intention, relationship. Bringing the two terms together under our discussion that God is the covenant Lord from last time, we can say that transcendence means God is the head of the covenant. It means his covenant Lordship, his covenant headship. God is the master of his creation. And Imminence refers to God's covenant, intimacy, and involvement. What I'm getting out here is that even though God cannot be confused with the created order, God is free to enter into the created order. God is free to enter into covenant relationship. Now again, these two terms can be used many ways, and they've been used many ways by different philosophers. The word Imminence is especially plastic in the history of philosophy and theology. What I'm suggesting here is what I think is a proper, biblically informed understanding of the language. But let's take up a bit more of this issue of the realm of being and the realm of knowing. Again, the realm of being or anthology asks, what is it, what's the nature of the thing? And the realm of knowing epistemology asks, how can the thing be known? These two realms must always be distinguished, but they must never be separated. Declarations about transcendence or imminence in the realm of being often come with uncritical assumptions about the realm of knowledge. And as an example there, go right back to clocker. God is so transcendent that we can't know. So we make casual assumptions or statements in one area and it comes with entailments in the other area. This brings us to see transcendence and imminence within frames square of opposition. To see how these two terms are used and confused, we might look at John Frames framing, excuse the pun, them in the square of opposition, which he himself, I think, stole from Aristotle. You'll see that's the square of opposition there in front of you. The four corners in the square represent four assertions. You see point number one there at the top left. God is distinguished from creation as its lord. Here we have transcendence as an ontological qualifier. That's point one there. Point number two, this is also in the left side of the page, is the biblical side of the page. God is involved with creation as its lord. This is imminence as a term of proximity. Go to the right side of the page now, the unbiblical column, with the unbiblical use. Point three, God is infinitely removed from creation. This is an assertion of transcendence as an epistemological assertion. You might want to pen right there next to point three, existentialism, radical existentialism. And then point four, God is identical to creation. This is thinking of imminence as an ontological qualifier. And there you might pen pantheism or process thought, whichever might help you remember it or think of it better. Now the diagonal lines that you see there going from one to four and two to three represent lines of direct contradiction. For example, number one, God is distinguished from creation as its creator contradicts point four. Yes, point four, which denies the creator creation, ontological distinction. Because pantheism says what, that creation itself is God. This automatically tells us that the terms transcendence and imminence cannot both be ontological qualifiers. Also, point two, which asserts a meaningful involvement of God in the world, contradicts point three. Existentialism, which really denies it. In other words, God's moral proximity to the world denies radical transcendence, the kind that we see held by some existentialists which assert the fundamental unknowability of God. Now, just looking at transcendence, just look at the top line now. I know we're looking at him this way and then this way now at the top line, looking at just transcendence for a moment. Although one in three are opposed to one another, they can be confused if the order of being and the order of knowing are also confused. In other words, God's ontological otherness should not entail a necessary epistemological distance. And that brings us to Roman numeral five in our discussion this evening. Covenant, lordship, and covenant presence. Rhonda, yes, probably. I think what will happen, Rhonda, if you go back and read your notes when they're fairly fresh and what we've done, it will start to make sense. I think it is important to understand how the terms transcendence and eminence should be used but also how they're often misused. I think you do want to win at least that. Does that make sense? Yes. Again, go back to plot her statement. Here's what we want to pick up here to Roman numeral five. A does God's transcendence over his creation entail agnosticism on our part? No, it should not. But some people will speak of God's transcendence that way, that they'll try to force that conclusion. Does that make sense? Yes. Thank you. God's transcendence in scripture. Now here I'm thinking in physical terms, the story we actually had in front of us in the Bible. God's transcendence does not simply center on ontological distinction. Remember that fact that we can always distinguish between the creator and the creation. It also seems to me centers on God's sovereign power and authority over his creation. What I'm nibbling at here is that God's transcendence needs to be understood in covenant relationship as God relates to the creation. God's power and authority while it exalts him far above anything creaturely is never an unknowable power and authority. God exercises his lordship. He is sovereign over creation as its creator and its redeemer. And he's the sovereign, sustainable things. And one of the ways that he exercises his authority is that he upholds his right to be obeyed over and over again. The covenant stresses that facts. And how often in very explicit terms his servants are to obey him. What I'm getting at here is this, God's power must be experienced. His authority must be known for it to be meaningful. If God does not relate to us in covenant, it really doesn't make a whole lot of difference. How high-falute in our statements of his transcendence are. Does that make sense? Don't do this to me. Aside from God's covenant lordship, statements about God's transcendence are largely irrelevant. Now I want to appreciate and even respect Barx and Plocker's assertions that our statements about God can become idols if we forget that he sovereignly transcends any language we'll use about him. The danger of their position is that God is reduced to a philosophical principle. It seems to me that's even more dangerous, even more problematic than the other side of an over-familiarity. In many ways the covenant calls us to that very familiarity. We'll see that. So be. As transcendence does not entail a nobility, so immanence does not entail identity or association. God's immanence makes up here myself. God's immanence may be described as his personal solidarity with his creation. As the sovereign lord, God creates the world and then immediately he enters into it and walks in it. He personally elects of people and he identifies their mission with his goals, the heart of the covenant relationship which gives meaning to the term immanence is of course the covenant formula which we talked about last time. I will be your God, you will be my people. God names himself as Yahweh, the king of Israel, and thus he associates himself with Israel. But this is a covenantal, not an ontological identification. It is a moral identification. Thus God is with them, he is near them in new testament terms, he becomes immanuel. God with us, but he is not us. See, neither of these terms transcendence or immanence, despite the kind of philosophical context I put them into, neither of them should be thought as vague, abstract principles. They rather are both very deeply personal and practical. The fact that God is transcendent, different from us means that he is nameable, to call him the universe is to confuse him with that which is his product. The fact that God is different from us and we know that difference by his revelation means that we can name him, I should say, we should not say that we can name him, but that he is nameable, he names himself. The fact that God is imminent means that we can have personal relationship with him. God comes to us as the covenant lord and he invites us into relationship. Both God's transcendence and his immanence, not general ideas of them, but he is real transcendence and immanence, our fundamental, covenantal realities of scripture. Both are necessary to understanding that he is the living and true God, the one God who is opposed to the death and idols that we make up. Well, that brings our discussion of covenant lordship to a conclusion, except that I am going to invite you to ask some questions here in a second. I don't know how I could repeat that question simply. In some ways asked me, has the historical discussion between, for example, philosophy and biblical religion on the other hand? How is that historical discussion brought light clarity or has it merely confused the issue? At the threat of getting ahead of myself, because we are going to head in that direction anyway, let me say, I think it has confused the issue. But the final analysis, I am going to suggest that philosophy gets in the way, far more often than it helps, that if it did not, if it really helped, then God goofed when he couched his word in the terms that he did. If I really need, if I need to take a course in philosophy in order to understand the Bible, then what God really should have done instead of giving me the stories that he has, he should have given me a series of lectures in philosophy. Does that make sense? More than kernels of truth, we are going to see that with scripture, what we see is a truth that is embodied, what we see is a truth that is put into historical, covenantal, often, creaturely context, so that we can understand it. And what has happened is that we have sought to universalize it, we have sought to abstract it, we have sought to get rid of the historical realities because we thought they weren't important, and what we did is we actually lost something of substance. What I'm going to end up arguing, and you'll see this by next week, is that if we paid more attention to how scripture actually talks about God, we'd be a long ways ahead, that most of our talk about God, I won't say it's unbiblical, but it's extrabiblical, it's in categories, it's in terms, it's in stories that we do not find in the biblical materials. I hope that gives you some comfort of why I'm going to do this this week, of dragging you through the philosophical lane. I would like you to get some sense of just how problematic some of these issues have become, so much so that we cannot see the biblical materials for what they actually are. Classical proofs for God's existence. I should have put a name up here on the board as well, let me do that now. The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who reigned as Emperor, these are not the dates of his life, but of his reign, reigned from 161 to 180, was a staunch persecutor of the church. But even though Aurelius persecuted Christians, he was no unthinking brute. In fact, he was a very educated man, and he was a devotee, a follower of stoic philosophy. As such, he was a rationalist. He was opposed to Christianity because he was convinced that it's a stubbornly irrational religion. There claims of supernatural miracles, of a divinely inspired book, of the messiah ship, of an unlettered Palestinian carpenter are all contrary to reason and common sense. And there claim that their sect of all the beliefs in the world is true, that only it is true, that only they truthfully represent the character of God and his ways, makes them narrow-minded, irrational, bigots. Thus, Marcus Aurelius would typify the early Christians as a rabble of ill-literate bumpkins, and thus it was easy to persecute this band of unsophisticated, superstitious people. They worshiped an unlettered, untraveled Jew as God come in the flesh, and they concern themselves with a bunch of silly stories about a God who enters into creation and into history to save them. Well, beginning already in the late second century, the same century of Marcus Aurelius, Christian theologians began to defend the Christian religion against these kinds of charges. And the men who took on this task were called apologists, to give an apology is to make a defense. It is not to say, I'm sorry, the classical term apology means to make a defense. The apologists were particularly concerned to show that Christianity is a reasonable religion. One can be within their intellectual rights and still be a Christian. With that in view, such people as Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria sought to present Christianity as the highest and purest philosophy. To do that, they gave special attention to the conclusions of Greek natural theology, or could be called natural religion. I think I've used both terms somewhat interchangeably. And they argued that Christianity is not the enemy, but rather the fulfillment of philosophy. Martyr argued that Christianity is fundamentally a philosophical religion. The truths of the Christian religion are philosophical truths. That means its truths are universal. They're not tied to any particular time or place or story. The particulars that are there are merely there as pedagogical tools. And they actually mediate universal philosophical concepts. Justin Martyr further argued that before Christ's coming in the flesh, God had inspired the philosophers of ancient Greece. Such thinkers as Plato and Philo had a right understanding of God's nature, and were in a sense Christians before Christianity, because they lived by right reason. This suggests we need to say something about the Greek philosophical method for thinking about God. The Greek philosophical method for doing theology, or thinking about God, worked by way of analogy. That's our second term here. God can be known by reflecting on human being. And then extrapolating that reflection out into what we restate that. Extrapolating that reflection out into what would be appropriate for a divine being. There are two primary methods for the Greek use of analogy. First of all, the way of eminence or super-arrogation. And what you basically do there, we're looking at a human being. We're thinking that there's an analog between us and God. So we look at human potentials, human powers, human capacities. And we see that we have some good potentials, some good powers. Such things as, well, power, power is good. More power is better. Matter of fact, all power is best. So if we have potency, God must have all potency. Thus God is omnipotence. We have intelligence. And some of us have more intelligence. That's good. Well, God must have all. He must know all things. Thus God is omniscient. We have presence. You know, we have extension. We feel space. That's good. Well, God must feel all space. So God is omnipresent. So we take human capacities that we think of as good. And we expand them to infinity. That's the principle of super-arrogation or the way of eminence. The other principle that they used was called the Via Negativa. This term has been used in other contexts in the history of theology. But one way it's used is this. Again, we look at our person, whoever it is. We also know that this person has some qualities we just as soon didn't have. They're bad. They're less than good. You see, human beings, we change. We do change, right? I was not always bald. I heard hair once. We're mutable. We change. Well, God doesn't change. So God is immutable. We negate that property. Human beings are passionate. Our feelings change. And the Greek term is passable. And thus the Greeks said God is impassable. He is not bound by passing emotional states. We are temporal. We are bound by time. And our sense is that's bad. So we negate that. And we say that God is eternal. We are finite. God is infinite. So we have by looking at simply a person and thinking of an analogy between a human being and God. We expand positive attributes into infinity. And we negate negative attributes. And what we come up with is a collection of attributive statements. And this can be called the process of natural theology or natural religion. The point of Greek natural theology was the proposition that God's character even his essence can be known by human rational processes. We just kind of demonstrated it. That whatever we need to know about God, we can know through rational means. All up to speed. Does that make sense, folks? I keep stepping on my cord here this evening. Anyway, beginning with the apologists, Greek philosophy and biblical religion about God were synthesized into a single, syncretistic conception of God. Let me explain the word syncretism. Syncretism is the bringing of two opposing principles methods or systems together in such a way that the product is neither purely one or the other. I'm going to suggest that the apologists syncretized Greek philosophy with biblical religion and what they ended up with was neither quite Greek philosophy nor biblical religion. It was a hybrid. The content of the biblical revelation was accommodated to a Greek rationalist worldview and a philosophical methodology. To this day, to this day, when you ask people how they would go about studying God, they will oftentimes tell you well, I'm going to look at the divine attributes. And they don't realize that they're simply recapitulating the processes and the thought forms of pagan philosophy. Again, the definition of syncretism is the bringing of two opposing principles together so that the product is neither one nor the other. It is a hybrid. Now, it's common today to refer to this product of this long tradition of interchange between Christian thought and Greek philosophy as classical fism. I'm not going to try to define that term because Bray has talked about it quite a bit and by this point, you've already bumped into it. I think that as we talk, you will get a sense for the term. The vast majority of Christian theology since the early church has seen the doctrine of God through the vocabulary and through the methods of Greek philosophical reflection. What this means, folks, is that the conception of God that most Western people have, whether Christian or not, and thus the deity they actually worship or think of as God, is as much the product of a philosophical system that is extrabiblical as it is the product of biblical reflection. Does that make sense? Again, it's hitting on the issue of syncretism. As Bray tells the story, the second and third century syncretism, the relationship between the biblical faith and Greek philosophical insight is a history of mutual accommodation, I think that's the kind of close to the term that he uses. Yes, things like Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotunism influence the way that Christians thought about God. But Bray contends that the reverse is also true. Christian commitments either altered these philosophical methods or they functioned as the Paul Bears at their funerals. It's not our concern here to either agree or disagree with Bray's analysis, but merely to witness, along with him, that the product of the long interchange between Christian thinking about God and philosophical thinking about God is something we might call classical theism. By the way, you might look at pages 40 and following if you find this language still a bit confusing. Well, that brings us up to speed so that we are ready to look at Roman No. 2, characteristics of classical theism. This will help to start give more definition to the term as well. You'll notice Thomas Aquinas' name there, or Tomism there, in Bracus. Thomas Aquinas is a medieval Roman Catholic theologian taught at the University of Paris, and he's usually thought of as kind of a poster boy for classical theism. In other words, he gives it its most highly developed articulation. He does more with the notion of bringing together Christian thought and philosophical thought. Then anyone else certainly until recent philosophical history. Well, let's look at these characteristics. The first one on our list here is ontological correspondence, and all we mean by this is this. The divine corresponds in some fundamental way with the creaturely or phenomenal. In other words, there is an analogy between the creature and the creator. Now, I'm going to say more about this as we proceed. I think that's enough at this point. I'm going to say more here about B. No ability or what I've called on your outline epistemological correspondence. This correspondence, this ontological correspondence between the divine and the phenomenal, implies that God can be known by an analogical analysis of the phenomenal world. Can I say that in English? That God can be known by looking at the world. These analogs can't even be spoken of as proofs of the divine by an examination of the creaturely realm. One is led to God and God in some way corresponds to our world. According to Aquinas, the fact that God created the world points to a fundamental analogy of being or the analogia entis between God and the world. There's not only an epistemological correspondence, but an ontological continuity between them. Let me explain this. Think you're a latter. At the top of the latter is God. At the top of the latter is pure spirit. God is the source of all being. All other beings other than God are derived being. And they are derived from His being. This is the classic Greek notion here. Well, a little bit lower than God. We have angels. A little bit lower than angels. What we do here is we start adding some matter. So we put some bodies on these critters. We have humans. Actually, to be really faithful to the Greeks, we have to say we have men. And then we have women. But we won't go there. Below humans, we have different kinds of animals, whatever your favorite animal, I guess would be up here, you know, guinea pigs, and then down the line. Down here, we have base matter. Sometimes called the great chain of being. If you think of this instead of a ladder, think of it as a chain. But this is basically the idea that we can know what God is like because we're made up of the same fundamental stuff. We're simply more matter and less spirit makes sense, guys. Now you can see how using all this stuff, see how confusing the order of being and the order of knowing God. It just got all mismatched together. The created order is an ontological extension of the divine. That's the way medieval philosophy and theology looked at it. God is the source or the locus of all being. The phenomenal reality is derived being derived from God and thus derived from his being. See, distinction. While classical theism did much, perhaps way too much with this notion of analogy, especially as it went into ontological issues, it must also be noted that classical theism did not deny a real distinction between the divine and the creaturely. They did want to say that God is fundamentally independent from his works, from his creation, to say God is not simply to voice a synonym for world or man. They did want to hold on to an analogy, an ontological analogy that gave them an epistemological correspondence, but they also want to hold on to a distinction. What this means for the idea of analogy is that the difference is as important as the correspondence between the divine and the creaturely. This means that the correspondence found in the analogy of being is a real correspondence. It implies two magnitudes, not one. Correspondence, you need two. Lightness is not sameness. That's probably the best way to state that in short compass. Now, some folks would forget the issue of distinction. I'm just going to real quick mention these because I've included them on your outline. The mystical tradition would take the idea of continuity to the extreme. They would take it so far that they would approach real pantheism. If it was thought of cosmically, then God simply absorbs all things. If it was thought of more anthropocentric, or more in terms of us, of man, and this is part of the Eastern tradition, end up with a notion of man's deification. If man is God, then man can become divine, man can become divinized at the time here. Okay, we'll do it D. God's X, hard what God is. Now, that can be articulated in many ways. Nature precedes function, is always under threat of being marginalized, or forgot this distinction, became in medieval theology. However, problematic it was for our appreciation of history and creation. We should note, and I think affirm the fundamental contention that underlies the claim, and it's simply this. If God is the great creator, if He's the ultimate maker of all things, then His own person, His own nature, cannot be open to being relativized by what He makes. God's nature does precede come before His actions. God must be fundamentally independent of all contingent reality. See, the top of page 46 in Bray for discussion here. In other words, Christians didn't simply fall for a philosophical trick when they made the distinction between nature and acts, but we're going to see that problems do arise here. You may simply be getting ahead of me, Ronda, asking the question and going to answer. So can I hold off? E, we're going to start to see the problems here under E. The distinction between divine nature and works. As Bray puts it in the opening paragraph of chapter 2, the issue of the divine nature asks the question, what is God like, or simply what is God? It's a definition question. On the other hand, God's works and His relationships are separate from that question. When we ask questions about God's works and relationships, we're not asking what is God, we're asking who is God? That's the way that Bray puts it. As we noted under D, classical theism held that the question of nature is prior to the question of relationship. But further, and here's where the problem really begins, listen up. Nature deals with what is essential or necessary, that which is necessarily true about God. While relationship works, acts, those sorts of things are accidental and accidental in the philosophical sense. Here's the point, if God is independent of His works, then His historical relationships are accidental. They're not necessary to who He is. They're not necessary to His being. Thus it's not essential that we study or attend to the creed of act, to the Exodus, to the election of Israel, to the wilderness wanderings, to the incarnation, the crucifixion, the resurrection, in order to know the fundamental nature of God. As a matter of fact, according to this process, according to this tradition, God would be no less God if He chose not to engage in any of those events and relationships. That's why they're accidental. An accidental property doesn't have to take place and you still have what's there. And God can be known without reference to them. Yes, we're going to break in just a minute. Let's finish this up with F. Notice that by making this move, we have bracketed out all of God's historical relating. We are engaged purely in what is often called natural theology or natural religion. For our purposes here, we don't need to define natural theology as anything more than this. Reflection about God which is done without recourse to particular revelation. Without recourse to God's self-disclosure in history, Jesus Scripture. When we do natural theology, we are speaking about God without reference to covenantal realities. And thus we are seeking to speak about God as He is in and of Himself.